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Abstract: The effectiveness of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) may be assessed 
according to two main indicators: i) The extent to 
which policymakers acknowledge the factual validity 
of the knowledge base provided, and ii) the extent to 
which policymakers also act upon the policy 
implications of this knowledge base. It is in no doubt 
that IPCC has been very successful when it comes to 
getting acceptance of the scientific foundation and 
state of knowledge about the climate issue. It has also 
created considerable media attention to the issue of 
climate change, despite a lack of a comprehensive 
communication strategy. While generally successful 
when measured against the first indicator, the IPCC 
has not been equally successful in terms of inducing 
an adequate policy response. The IPCC played an 
important role in the establishment of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
perhaps the Kyoto Protocol. But even if policymakers 
succeed in strengthening the GHG emissions reduction 
commitments of the UNFCCC at near-term COP 
meetings (i.e. 2010), this policy response is too weak 
to qualify as “acting upon” the policy implications of 
the knowledge base provided by the IPCC. An 
assessment of how much of this outcome that should 
be ascribed to shortcomings in the design of the IPCC 
and how much that is linked to the political conflicts 
climate policies are associated with, requires further 
analysis. 
 
 
Språk:  Language of report: English 
 
Rapporten kan bestilles fra: 
CICERO Senter for klimaforskning 
P.B. 1129 Blindern 
0318 Oslo 
 
 
Eller lastes ned fra: 
http://www.cicero.uio.no 
 
The report may be ordered from: 
CICERO (Center for International Climate and 
Environmental Research – Oslo) 
PO Box 1129 Blindern 
0318 Oslo, NORWAY 
 
Or be downloaded from: 
http://www.cicero.uio.no 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Contents   
2 A short history of the IPCC ............................................................................................................. 1 
3 Structures ......................................................................................................................................... 4 
4 The assessment process ................................................................................................................... 5 
5 Participation by developing countries ............................................................................................. 8 
6 The use of published and non-published sources ............................................................................ 8 
7 The effectiveness of the IPCC process ............................................................................................ 9 
8 Assessing general lessons from the IPCC experience ................................................................... 10 
8.1 THE IPCC’S INTERGOVERNMENTAL STATUS ........................................................................................ 10 
8.2 INCORPORATION OF POTENTIAL “SPOILERS” ......................................................................................... 12 
8.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEADERSHIP AND RULES OF PROCEDURE ........................................................... 13 
8.4 THE COMPLEXITY AND BUREAUCRACY OF THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS ................................................. 13 
 
 
 
 
CICERO Policy Note 2010:01  
               The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): Outline of an assessment 
 
 
 
1 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The IPCC was established in 1988 under the auspices of the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program( UNEP). It is an 
intergovernmental body, open to all members of the UN and WMO, tasked with the 
assessment of state-of-the-art scientific knowledge on climate change. The IPCC does not 
itself conduct research but assesses scientific, technical and socio-economic publications that 
are relevant to understand climate change. The assessments are provided in a set of reports 
published at regular intervals. So far, the IPCC has published four assessment reports in 1990, 
1995, 2001 and 2007. 
Since its establishment, the IPCC has increasingly acquired authority as a reliable source of 
information on updated scientific knowledge on a broad spectrum of aspects associated with 
climate change. In this discussion paper, we briefly summarize the IPCC’s history and mode 
of operation and discuss some of the key features of this organization and their impact on the 
IPCC’s role in the development of international political agreements to mitigate and adapt to 
human-induced climate change.  
 
2  A short history of the IPCC1
In late 1962, the UN General assembly established a scientific committee to contribute to and 
supplement the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). Thus, science was given a more 
prominent place in meteorology, and a framework was developed for considering climate 
change as a scientific issue. Already in 1958 the International Council of Scientific Unions 
(ICSU) established a Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) and also harboured a group 
called the International Union of Geology and Geophysics (IUGG). ICSU and WMO 
recognized the need for collaboration on atmospheric science and together established the 
International Committee on Atmospheric Science (CAS) in 1963. Bert Bolin was appointed 
chairman of CAS, and they started work on a Global Atmospheric Research Programme 
(GARP) where one of the aims was to carry out large, synchronized observational field 
expeditions, to map the state of the atmosphere over large areas in greater detail than previous 
observational work had made possible. The planning of this activity greatly increased the 
international cooperation and also engaged key scientists that later would play important roles 
in the establishment of the IPCC. Thus, in 1967, WMO and ICSU decided to launch GARP 
and a Joint Organizing Committee (JOS) was established with 12 members
 
2
The political side of the issue can perhaps be traced back to the preparation for the first 
international conference on environment and development taking place in Stockholm in 1972 
(the UN Conference on Human Development). The preparation started already in 1969 when 
Carrol Wilson from MIT organized a Study of Critical Environmental Problems (SCEP). It 
was felt that the climate issue deserved more attention, so another group carried out a Study 
on Man’s Impact on Climate (SMIC) again under the leadership of Carrol Wilson. A 
 appointed by the 
two founding organisations. This strengthened the international cooperation on the science 
side of the climate issue.  
                                                     
1 For a full account of the events that led to the establishment of the IPCC, see Agrawala (1998a) and 
Bolin (2007).  
2 The members were: Bert Bolin (Sweden) as chairman, V. A. Bugaev (USSR), F. Möller (West 
Germany), A. S. Monin (USSR), P. Morel (France), Y. Ogura (Japan), P. R. Pisharoty (India), C. H. B. 
Priestly (Australia), J. S. Sawyer (UK), J. Smagorinsky (US), R. W. Stewart (Canada), V. E. Suomi 
(USA) and R V. Garcia (Argentina) as secretary. 
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workshop was held in Stockholm in 1971 (some 30 scientists from 14 countries attended), 
where for instance Manabe and Watherald’s study of the impact of CO2 from 1967 (Manabe 
and Wetherald, 1967) was presented. Stephen Schneider was the secretary of the conference, 
and produced his own influential book on climate change a few years later (Schneider, 1976). 
All of these events enhanced policy makers’ awareness of the climate change issue.  
Partially as a consequence of this, the US National Academy of Sciences initiated an 
assessment of the state of knowledge and recommendations in 1977 under the chairmanship 
of Jules Charney. He led a group of 8 scientists, including Bert Bolin. Also the Council of 
Environmental Quality led by Gus Speth recommended to Jimmy Carter that US leadership 
should be exercised on the topic of climate change. 
Partly as a follow-up to the UN Stockholm conference, the first World Climate Conference 
was organized under UNEP and WMO auspices in 1979. Again, Bert Bolin was asked to 
chair the conference, illustrating the influence he had in almost all aspects leading up to the 
formal creation of IPCC.  
A first international assessment of the climate change challenge was carried out in 1980 by 
ICSU, UNEP and WMO under the chairmanship of Bert Bolin. This assessment largely 
repeated the findings of the 1977 US NAS assessment. It was concluded that there was a need 
more depth, substance and more international attendance and cooperation in future 
assessments. 
In 1982, the executive director of UNEP, Mustafa Tolba, met Bert Bolin and Göran Svensson, 
former under secretary of the Swedish Ministry of Environment and a key player in the 1972 
Stockholm conference. With UNEP funding, the University of Stockholm with Bert Bolin 
was given the go ahead for another assessment project. This was carried out with UNEP, 
WMO and ICSU through its Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) 
committee. 
Together, UNEP, the ICSU and WMO initiated a set of workshops held in Villach, Austria, in 
1980, 1983, and 1985. These meetings coincided with partly diverging assessments of climate 
change in the U.S. by the National Research Council and the Environmental Protection 
Agency in 1983 (Agrawala 1998a). After the success of the negotiation of the Vienna 
Convention on Ozone, UNEP’s executive director Mostafa Tolba felt that the time was ripe to 
repeat the ozone ‘miracle’ for climate (Agrawala 1998a). UNEP in a long term planning 
document from 1985 called for a climate convention and started active consulting with WMO 
and ICSU to that end. He also wrote a letter to then US secretary of state Georg Schultz 
urging US to take appropriate action (Hecht and Tirpak 1995). These actions were the 
beginning of both the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) in July 1986 and later 
IPCC in 1988.  
After the 1985 meeting in Villach, scientists warned that “in the first half of the next century a 
rise of global mean temperature would occur which is greater than any in man’s history” and 
recommended that “scientists and policymakers should begin active collaboration to explore 
the effectiveness of alternative policies and adjustments” (cited in Agrawala 1998a: 608). In 
1986 the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) was established under the joint 
sponsorship of UNEP, WMO and ICSU. A small group of prominent scientists, including 
Bert Bolin, was nominated by each of the three founding organizations. Meetings organized 
by the AGGG in 1987 led some scientists to recommend that “policymakers should set 
‘maximum’ rates of sea level increase at between 20 and 50 mm per decade and a maximum 
rate of temperature increase at 0.1°C per decade” (Agrawala 1998a: 610). J. Hansen’s 
testimony to the US Congress that anthropogenic climate change is here, and a high-level 
political meeting in Toronto later in 1988 where several ambitious emissions reductions 
targets were announced, made it clear to Bert Bolin among other scientists that a broader and 
more structured approach to climate change assessments was needed (Bolin 2007). 
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Amidst the many (and partly diverging) statements from both scientists and policymakers 
during this period, the U.S. in particular saw the need for an intergovernmental mechanism to 
conduct an international assessment of the climate change problem. This position was 
communicated to the WMO secretariat in May 1987 and had significant impact on the design 
of the IPCC (Agrawala 1998a). In 1988 the IPCC was established as an intergovernmental 
organization under WMO and UNEP auspices. The initial task of the IPCC, as outlined in UN 
General Assembly Resolution 43/53 of 6 December 19883
How did it come about that the IPCC was recognized by the UN General Assembly? In 1987 
both WMO and UNEP made the necessary formal decisions to establish an intergovernmental 
assessment – the IPCC. In 1988 the call went out to all member nations to send 
representatives to the founding meeting to take place in November the same year. Only 28 
countries responded to the call, and only 11 of these were developing countries. The climate 
issue was clearly still not high on the political agenda. Mr. Tolba, the executive director of 
UNEP, had taken charge of the preparations for the meeting. At the meeting Tolba asked Bert 
Bolin to be the first chairman of the IPCC. After consultation and support from Swedish 
authorities, Bolin accepted. Also a Vice Chairman, A. Al-Gain from Saudia Arabia, and a 
rapporteur, J. A. Adejokun from Nigeria, were elected. Tolba also suggested the structure of 
three working groups to be formed. Working group I on assessment of available scientific 
information on climate change, was to be chaired by Sir John Houghton (UK). Working 
Group II on assessment of environmental and socio-economic impacts of climate change was 
to be chaired by Dr. Yuri Izrael (USSR), while Working Group III on the formulation of 
response strategies was to be led by assistant secretary of state, Dr Fredrick Bernthal (US). 
WMO was put in charge of secretarial functions and appointed N. Sundararaman as the 
IPCC’s secretary.  
, was to prepare a comprehensive 
review of the state of knowledge of the science of climate change, the social and economic 
impacts of climate change, and possible response strategies to address climate change (Bolin 
2007).  
A work programme for the IPCC was naturally discussed at the first meeting, and Malta 
pushed very hard for the provision of an IPCC report in time for the UN General Assembly in 
1990. Simultaneously, Malta proposed a resolution to the UN General Assembly on 
‘Conservation of Climate as Part of the Common Heritage of Mankind’ inviting the IPCC to 
submit its first assessment on the issue of human-induced climate change. This was agreed by 
the UN General Assembly, implying a recognition of the IPCC by the UN already from the 
start4
 
.  
                                                     
3 The UN General Assembly Resolution 43/53, 1988: the UN General Assembly requested ’the 
Secretary-General of WMO and the Executive Director of UNEP together with the IPCC immediately 
to initiate action leading, possibly within the next eighteen months, to a comprehensive review and 
recommendations with respect to 
(a) the state of knowledge of the science of climate and climate change, with special emphasis on 
global warming, 
(b) programmes and studies of the social and economic impact of climate change particularly 
global warming, 
(c) possible policy responses by Governments and others to delay, limit or mitigate the impact of 
climate change, 
(d) relevant treaties and other legal instruments dealing with climate, 
(e) elements for possible inclusion in a future international convention on climate.’ 
4 Bolin (2007) says that the Malta proposal to the UN was ‘in parallel’ to the first IPCC plenary. 
Agrawala (1998a) says that the proposal to UN was ‘just weeks before the first plenary of IPCC’.  
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Figure 2. The science–policy interface of the IPCC. The arrows represent rough illustrations 
of formal and informal channels of communication. Source: Skodvin (2000a: 107). 
 
4 The assessment process6
IPCC rules of procedures have been developed incrementally in two main revisions. Starting 
out with relatively few formalised rules of procedures in 1988 largely based on WMO 
procedures, the first main revision in 1993 served to formalise rules and procedures that had 
been incrementally developed and guided the panel’s work more or less informally during the 
first phase of its operation. Rules of procedure underwent a second major revision in 1998/99 
in which general “Principles governing IPCC work” were adopted in 1998 (IPCC 1998), 
supplemented in 1999 by detailed rules and procedures for the preparation, review, 
acceptance, adoption, approval and publication of IPCC reports (IPCC 1999). It was also 
established that IPCC rules of procedures should be reviewed every five years and “amended 
as appropriate” (IPCC 1998, Article 16). 
 
The panel operates with three categories of endorsement of its reports: Acceptance by the 
Panel or Working Group plenaries “signifies that the material has not been subject to line by 
line discussion and agreement, but nevertheless presents a comprehensive, objective and 
balanced view of the subject matter”. Adoption signifies that the text has been endorsed 
“section-by-section”. Approval means that the text “has been subjected to detailed, line by 
line discussion and agreement” (IPCC 1999).  
At the start of an assessment process, the leadership of each WG, selected by the IPCC 
plenary with due consideration of regional (i.e. developed world and developing world 
participation), develops an outline and a work-plan for the assessment, which is subsequently 
                                                     
6 This section is based on Alfsen et al (2000); Skodvin (2000a, b), and IPCC (1998; 1999). 
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approved by the plenary of the WG and accepted by the full panel plenary. Governments 
nominate teams of convening lead authors, lead authors, review editors and contributing 
authors. The bureau (chair and vice-chairs) of each WG selects convening lead authors, lead 
authors and review editors from the nomination lists provided by governments. Contributing 
authors may also be specially invited; however, with due consideration of the geographic 
balance of the groups, particularly with regard to ensuring participation by scientists from 
developing countries. Lead authors participate in their personal capacities. 
The assessment reports are developed in the scientific core of the IPCC, in a series of 
meetings in task forces and sub-groups established for particular issues, workshops and 
conferences, and most importantly, in regular lead- and contributing author meetings. The 
summaries to the assessments – the summary for policy-makers (SPM) and the executive 
summary (ES) – are also developed at this level.  
Scientists active in research dominate participation in the scientific core. When a draft report 
has been developed, it is submitted to an extensive, two-phased review procedure, including 
both expert and government review. According to the rules of procedure guiding the IPCC 
until 1999, lead authors, WG chairs, sub-group chairs and vice-chairs were responsible for 
incorporating comments from the review “as appropriate”. Lead authors, chairs and vice-
chairs were encouraged to arrange wider meetings with principal contributors and reviewers 
to discuss particular aspects or areas of major differences, as deemed necessary and if time 
and funding permitted. It was emphasised that the assessment reports “describe different 
(possibly controversial) scientific or technical views on a subject, particularly if they are 
relevant to the political debate”. With the 1999 revision of IPCC rules of procedure, review 
editors were given the responsibility to oversee the review process on each chapter of IPCC 
assessment reports (Skodvin 2000b; Edwards and Schneider 2001).7
…For approval, adoption and acceptance of reports, differing views 
shall be explained and, upon request, recorded. Differing views on 
matters of a scientific, technical or socio-economic nature shall, as 
appropriate in the context, be represented in the scientific, technical or 
socio-economic document concerned. Differences of views on matters 
of policy or procedure shall, as appropriate in the context, be recorded 
in the Report of the Session (IPCC 1998, Article 10). 
 With this revision, the 
recording of different views also acquired a formal procedure: 
The revised draft of the assessment and its summaries are then submitted to the WG plenary 
for acceptance and approval. At this level, the discussion takes on quite a different character. 
While the full scientific assessment report is accepted by the plenary en bloc and usually 
without further discussion, the summaries (the ES and the SPM) undergo a detailed and time 
consuming revision where the formulations of the documents are discussed and negotiated 
line-by-line. 
The main bulk of participants to WG plenaries are national delegations, comprising 
government officials, low-level policy-makers and/or scientists with governmental 
affiliations. National governments to a varying extent send independent scientists as members 
of national delegations to WG plenary meetings. It is primarily representatives of the teams of 
lead authors that represent the scientific community at this decision-making level. Lead 
authors have acquired a special status as authorities in the debate and substantive changes to 
the text of the summaries are not made without consent from the lead authors of the chapter in 
question. Thus, while government officials at this level outnumber scientists, the scientists 
still have a significant amount of control over the documents. The WG plenary discussions 
                                                     
7 For a critical and more detailed discussion of IPCC review procedures see Edwards and Schneider 
2001. 

CICERO Policy Note 2010:01 
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): Outline of an assessment 
 
 
 
 
8 
5  Participation by developing countries 
Equitable geographic representation was early recognised as an important feature of the IPCC 
(Agrawala 1998b). In their effort to keep the IPCC a small forum, however, the IPCC was 
originally designed on the basis of “core membership” in the WGs, with each WG initially 
consisting of thirteen to seventeen “core members” (Report of the first IPCC plenary session, 
item 3.7). The inconsistency of this design with the Panel’s intergovernmental status was 
recognised, however, and the design was abandoned already at the second session of the 
Panel (1989) to allow for a more widespread participation, especially by developing 
countries. Thus, the dominance by developed, Western, industrialised countries in IPCC 
bodies was recognised as a major challenge to the success of the process. A Special 
Committee on the Participation of Developing Countries was established in 1989 (Skodvin 
2000). This group presented its report at the fourth plenary session in Sundsvall in 1990 and 
recommended several actions to increase participation by developing countries. The most 
important measure was the provision of funds to support developing-country participation. In 
1992, developing-country participation was integrated at all levels of the IPCC, and the 
special committee was dissolved. This organisation change implied a restructured and 
enlarged bureau in order to achieve better geographical balance. From 1992, the bureau 
consisted of the chairman and the vice-chairmen of the panel, the co-chairmen and vice-
chairmen of the three WGs, and six regional representatives (Africa, Asia, Europe, North and 
Central America, South America and the Southwest Pacific) (Report of the eighth plenary 
session, item 6.12.2; Skodvin 2000). Presently, the task force on GHG inventories is also 
represented in the bureau.8
 
 The 1992 organisational change also implied increased attention to 
geopolitical representativeness as a recruitment principle in all IPCC bodies and at all levels. 
For instance, it was decided that the co- and vice-chairmen of IPCC WGs “should be chosen 
so that the developing and developed countries are equally represented”, however, with “due 
regard to the need to maintain the scientific-technical integrity of the IPCC” (IPCC Task 
Force on IPCC Structure, third session, Doc. 2, item 5.13). The participation of developing 
countries in the group of coordinating lead authors, lead authors and contributors is also 
emphasised in the rules of procedure ( see, for instance, IPCC 1999, item 4.2.2.).  
6  The use of published and non-published sources 
The distinction between assessment of existing scientific knowledge and production of new 
knowledge is important in the IPCC process. The IPCC is mandated to assess, not produce, 
scientific knowledge on climate change. In the 1993 rules of procedure, therefore, it is stated 
that “the essence of the lead authors’ task is synthesis of material drawn from the peer 
reviewed literature, generated at workshops or submitted by contributors” (IPCC 1993, 
Annex 2, item 1, our emphasis). The 1993 rules of procedure did, however, allow assessments 
also to be based on non-published sources, but only as long as they were “made available in 
pre-print form for IPCC review” (IPCC 1993, paragraph 2). In this phase, therefore, rules of 
procedure allowed assessments to be based on non-published sources in anticipation of their 
(subsequent) publication. This aspect of the IPCC rules of procedure thus seemed primarily to 
be linked, not to the nature of the sources, but rather at which stage in the publication process 
scientific sources became relevant to IPCC assessments. 
This interpretation is strengthened by the incidence that took place at the fourth WGI Plenary 
session in Maastricht in 1994, where the WG Plenary discussed the SPM of the Special 
                                                     
8 See also http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_bureau.htm, accessed 25 January 2010. 
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Report on “Radiative forcing of climate change” (IPCC 1995). Paragraph 2.3.2 of the SPM 
investigates emission profiles that would lead to stabilization of the atmospheric 
concentration of CO2. A key point brought up by the U.S.-based fossil fuel industry lobby 
group, the Global Climate Coalition (GCC), and major oil-producing states such as Kuwait, 
was whether this paragraph was an assessment of published and reviewed literature, or 
whether it rather was based on studies commissioned by the IPCC that were not yet published 
and properly peer reviewed. In the latter case, some NGOs and delegates maintained that the 
paragraph represented a violation of IPCC rules of procedure and should be deleted. The 
studies in question had been subject to peer review, although they had not yet been published, 
and they had been made available to the reviewers of the IPCC report (Skodvin 2000a). The 
position of the Kuwait delegation did not prevail. On the contrary, the position to retain the 
section in question was strongly supported by a majority of the delegations and set a 
precedent for this use of non-published sources. 
In 1999, however, IPCC rules of procedure were amended to allow the use of non-published 
and/or non-peer-reviewed sources in IPCC assessment reports (IPCC 1999, Appendix 2). In 
recognizing that “materials relevant to IPCC Reports, in particular, information about the 
experience and practice of the private sector in mitigation and adaptation activities, are found 
in sources that have not been published or peer-reviewed (e.g., industry journals, internal 
organizational publications, non-peer-reviewed reports or working papers of research 
institutions, proceedings of workshops etc.)” a whole new set of procedures guiding the use of 
this type of material were developed (IPCC 1999, Appendix 2). The 1999 revision of rules of 
procedure thus implies explicit admittance to use sources not only in anticipation of their 
publication (as before), but to use sources that will not be published in peer-reviewed journals 
or other scientific publications. Thus, the 1999 revision represents a quite significant break 
with previous principles and practice (Skodvin 2000b). 
 
7 The effectiveness of the IPCC process 
The effectiveness of the IPCC may be assessed according to two main indicators: i) The 
extent to which policymakers acknowledge the factual validity of the knowledge base 
provided, and ii) the extent to which policymakers also act upon the policy implications of 
this knowledge base (Andresen et al. 2000; Skodvin 2000a).  
Given the intergovernmental status of the IPCC, the factual validity of the knowledge base is 
accepted by policymakers as a function of the acceptance, adoption and approval of the 
various IPCC reports that are generated. As discussed above, policymakers and government 
representatives constitute a majority of the members of the IPCC bodies responsible for the 
formal endorsement of IPCC reports, the WG plenaries and the full panel plenary. Thus, 
IPCC reports represent the knowledge base on climate change whose factual validity is 
acknowledged by both scientists and policymakers. On this basis we may conclude that the 
IPCC has been effective in terms of the first of the two indicators.  
The IPCC reports document the risk that anthropogenic emissions of GHGs adversely affect 
the global climate. The second indicator could thus be made operative as the extent to which 
policies are developed to mitigate this risk. According to this operational definition, the policy 
implications of the IPCC’s knowledge base are considered to be acted upon to the extent that 
policies to mitigate the risk associated with anthropogenic GHG emissions are adopted.  
The international climate regime is constituted by two political agreements: The UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. The “ultimate objective” of the UNFCCC, which 
entered into force in 1994, is a “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
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climate system” (Article 2). The Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005, is the main 
instrument of the Climate Convention to implement its ultimate objective. The Protocol 
specifies a set of differentiated GHG emissions reduction commitments for industrialized 
countries amounting to a reduction of approximately 5 percent in emissions from 1990 levels 
by 2012. The Kyoto Protocol was never meant to be the only instrument for the 
implementation of the objective of the UNFCCC. Article 3 (paragraph 9) states that 
“Commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I shall be established in 
amendments to Annex B to this Protocol ...” The approach adopted in the climate regime, 
therefore, is an incremental development of policies to mitigate the risk of a human-induced 
climate change. This also should be taken into account in the assessment of the extent to 
which the policy implications of the knowledge base provided by the IPCC has been acted 
upon. Nevertheless, the current set of commitments is far from scientific assessments of what 
is required to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”9
Thus, even if policymakers succeed in strengthening the GHG emissions reduction 
commitments of the UNFCCC at near-term COP meetings (i.e. 2010), we may conclude that 
this policy response is too weak to qualify as “acting upon” the policy implications of the 
knowledge base provided by the IPCC. This implies that the IPCC process has been effective 
in terms of acquiring policymakers’ acknowledgement of the factual validity of the scientific 
knowledge base provided by the panel, but has not been effective in terms of generating 
policy actions to address the implications of this knowledge base, i.e., policies to mitigate the 
documented risk associated with anthropogenic GHG emissions. How much of this outcome 
that should be ascribed to shortcomings in the design of the IPCC and how much that is 
linked to the political conflicts with which climate policies are associated with, requires 
further analysis. 
.  
 
8  Assessing general lessons from the IPCC experience 
In an assessment of the success of the IPCC process and general lessons that may be drawn 
from this experience, several aspects should be considered. 
8.1 The IPCC’s intergovernmental status 
The key design feature of the IPCC is its intergovernmental status. Has this design served to 
enhance the panel’s capacity to influence the premises for the subsequent policy debate on 
GHG mitigation or has it rather contributed to undermine the panel’s scientific authority? 
As pointed out by Litfin, scientific knowledge is powerful as legitimization for policy choice:  
The cultural role of science as a key source of legitimation means that 
political debates are framed in scientific terms; questions of value 
become reframed as questions of fact, with each confrontation leading 
to the search for further scientific justification. Paradoxically, the 
                                                     
9 Determining what constitutes “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” in 
relation to Article 2 of the UNFCCC involves value judgements. Science can support informed 
decisions on this issue, including by providing criteria for judging which vulnerabilities might be 
labelled ‘key’. {SYR 3.3}. Key vulnerabilities may be associated with many climate-sensitive systems, 
including food supply, infrastructure, health, water resources, coastal systems, ecosystems, global 
biogeochemical cycles, ice sheets and modes of oceanic and atmospheric circulation. {WGII 19.ES}. 
More specific information is now available across the regions of the world concerning the nature of 
future impacts, including for some places not covered in previous assessments. {WGII SPM} (From 
IPCC 4AR Synthesis report, p. 64) 
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demand for legitimation results in a process of delegitimation (1994: 
4).  
In a similar vein, Collingridge and Reeve observe: 
Relevance to policy by itself, is sufficient to completely destroy the 
delicate mechanisms by which scientists normally ensure that their 
work leads to agreement. Consensus on scientific questions which are 
more than marginally relevant to policy is therefore impossible. 
Science under these conditions leads not to agreement, but to endless 
technical bickering about an ever growing number of issues (1986: ix-
x). 
One motivation for the IPCC’s intergovernmental design was to prevent mechanisms of de-
legitimization from torpedoing efforts to establish a consensus on what is known and what is 
not known in the science on climate change (Skodvin 2000a). This feature allowed 
policymakers to become more involved in the IPCC assessment process than in other, 
comparable assessment processes at the time the IPCC was established (e.g., the assessment 
process on ozone depletion, which also took place under WMO auspices). With the inclusion 
of policymakers in the process, IPCC reports were subjected to intense scrutiny by both 
scientists and policymakers representing different perspectives, positions and interests. Thus, 
IPCC conclusions could be assumed to be more robust and the scope for subsequent de-
legitimization of the knowledge base would be reduced. 
As pointed out by Agrawala (1998a, b) and Skodvin (2000a), the IPCC’s intergovernmental 
status has contributed both to enhance its influence on policymaking and, sometimes, to 
undermine its scientific authority. Agrawala maintains that “the intergovernmental nature of 
the IPCC was in large part responsible for educating many government bureaucrats about the 
problem which made them more willing to come to the negotiating table” (1998a: 611). 
According to his sources, this feature was “key to the signing of [UN]FCCC in 1992” (ibid.). 
On the other hand, Agrawala finds that “having an intergovernmental status has imposed 
significant costs also: IPCC assessment summaries are widely regarded as being politically 
negotiated, which has, at times, undermined their credibility” (ibid.).  
The intergovernmental status of the panel implies that policymakers become deeply involved 
particularly in the provision of IPCC assessment summaries (the ES and SPM), which many 
consider to constitute the knowledge base: The technical jargon and the sheer size of the main 
reports (with each report from the three WGs amounting to about a thousand pages) make 
them inaccessible to the lay public. The involvement of policymakers in the development of 
the summaries is seen by some as discrediting the scientific authority of the reports and 
indeed the entire process itself. During the mid-1990s conspiracy theories about the IPCC 
endeavour were quite frequent (see e.g., Boehmer-Christiansen 1994). It is curious, however, 
that more than twenty years after the IPCC was established, after four comprehensive 
assessment reports, which have involved a large share of the scientific community, the 
question of whether IPCC conclusions are scientifically or politically generated cannot seem 
to find its closure. An extreme illustration is the recent incident where the e-mail database of 
the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East Anglia was hacked and thousands 
of e-mails were illegally published on the internet.10
                                                     
10See 
 Again, conspiracy theories about the 
IPCC flourish. While small, the group of skeptics still makes a lot of noise and it does have 
some impact in the inner circles of the policy community. For instance, after the CRU-affair, 
Senator James Inhofe, ranking member of the U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee, stated that he would call for an investigation to “look into ‘the way that [IPCC 
http://www.climate-skeptic.com/ Accessed 29 November 2009.  
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scientists] cooked the science to make this thing look as if the science was settled, when all 
the time of course we knew it was not’.”11
8.2 Incorporation of potential “spoilers”
  
12
A main motivation for the IPCC’s intergovernmental status was to incorporate opposing 
perspectives in the assessment process. How important is it that all opposing camps are 
included? If it is not possible to incorporate all potentially opposing interests, which should be 
included and which should be ignored?  
 
In contrast to the assessment process on ozone depletion, industry interests were not invited to 
participate in the IPCC process. Represented by the U.S.-based Global Climate Coalition 
(GCC), the fossil-fuel industry represented one of the panel’s most vehement opponents, 
which, together with other expressed “IPCC skeptics”, succeeded in creating a lot of trouble 
in the aftermath of the panel’s publication of the 1995 Second Assessment Report (SAR). In 
brief, the situation arose after the lead author of chapter 8 changed text in the main report to 
accommodate changes made in the formulations of the SPM, both of which had been 
approved and accepted (respectively) at the WGI plenary meeting in November 2005. Chapter 
8 included the documentation of the conclusion that “…the balance of evidence suggests that 
there is a discernible human influence on global climate” and marked “the first time the IPCC 
had reached a consensus on two key points: first, that global warming is probably occurring 
(‘detection’), and second, that human activity is more likely than not a significant cause 
(‘attribution’)” (Edwards and Schneider 2001: 221). The IPCC and implicitly, Ben Santer, 
who was the lead author of this chapter and who had made the changes, was accused of 
making the changes to accommodate political purposes and hence of “violating the 
fundamental standards of scientific peer review” (ibid.). The accusations were, for instance, 
reported in Nature under the heading “Climate Report ‘Subject to Scientific Cleansing’” 
(Masood, 1996). While the accusations were repudiated as false, the discussion continued for 
months after the SAR was published in June 1996, and even resurfaced many years later, and 
the whole episode served to discredit the scientific authority of the IPCC, at least temporarily. 
This is but one example of GCC-initiated campaigns to discredit the IPCC’s credibility.13
The question is whether this and similar incidents could have been avoided or tempered by 
including the fossil-fuel industry in the assessment process. The oil industry, for instance, has 
technical expertise not covered by the IPCC process that is of key importance in the 
development of technological solutions to the climate problem, an aspect that was recognized 
in the 1999 revision of IPCC rules of procedure (see above).  
 
The risk of incorporating potential “spoilers” in the assessment process is that the process 
becomes unmanageable and fails to generate ‘consensus’. With the benefit of hindsight, 
however, the incorporation of the fossil-fuel industry in general and the oil industry in 
particular, might have prevented some of the fiercest attacks on the legitimacy of the IPCC 
process during the 1990s. In 1997/98 the climate strategies of major oil companies like Shell, 
BP, and Texaco began to change. Oil companies increasingly withdrew their support of the 
GCC and the lobbying organization was “deactivated” in 2001 (Skjærseth and Skodvin 2003). 
Interestingly, the New York Times reports on a document that shows that “even as the 
                                                     
11 E & E  News PM, 23 November 2009: ”Inhofe to seek federal probe of hacked e-mails”, by Robin 
Bravender. Retrieved 29 November 2009 from http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/print/2009/11/23/1. 
12 The term is taken from analyses of peace negotiations, where “spoilers” are defined as “outside 
parties who seek to undermine negotiations” (Watkins 1998).  
13 It is interesting to note that the corresponding sentence in the draft SPM as it was formulated before 
the 1995 WGI plenary (and which then presumably did correspond to the language of the main report) 
was: “Taken together, these results point towards a detectable human influence on global climate” 
(cited in Skodvin 2000: 117). 
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coalition worked to sway opinion, its own scientific and technical experts were advising that 
the science backing the role of greenhouse gases in global warming could not be refuted”.14
8.3 The significance of leadership and rules of procedure 
 
In this perspective, the inclusions of industry scientists in the IPCC process could have 
strengthened the assessment process and maybe even induced an earlier change in industry 
positions. 
The intergovernmental status of the IPCC made the panel more vulnerable to undue political 
influence on the substantive content of the assessment reports. The risk of politicization of 
IPCC conclusions was reinforced during the early phase of the panel’s operation by 
incomplete and largely informal rules of procedure. During the course of the IPCC process, 
the rules of procedure acquired a strong symbolic value as a main indicator of the scientific 
integrity of the panel. The rules of procedure were used by opponents to challenge the 
conclusions (or rather the manner in which they were generated), as well as by the IPCC 
leadership to defend the same conclusions. In the first case, the scientific validity of the 
panel’s conclusions was indirectly challenged by questioning the extent to which the rules of 
procedure had been followed in the generation of the conclusions. In the second case, the 
rules of procedure became the main tool for the WG and panel leadership to defend the same 
conclusions. During the early phases of the IPCC process, rules of procedure were not well 
developed and formalised. Indeed the SAR-controversy had its roots in this type of “meta 
discussion” and was one main cause of the 1999 revision of rules of procedure and the 
introduction of review editors in the process (Edwards and Schneider 2001). During this 
period, therefore, the relative well-functioning of the IPCC was very much due to the 
competence of the leadership of the panel. In particular, the nomination of Prof. Bert Bolin as 
the IPCC’s first chairman is likely to have had a significant impact on the effectiveness of the 
IPCC during this period. He was a highly respected scientist with years of experience also in 
operating in the science–policy interface (inter alia from his membership in the AGGG). 
Similarly, Prof. Bob Watson, who was Chairman of WGII from 1994 and Chairman of the 
Panel from 1997 to 2002, was also a respected scientist with a long career in the science–
policy interface. This potential “leadership effect” implies that it is difficult to distinguish the 
impact of organizational arrangements and competent leadership. 
8.4 The complexity and bureaucracy of the assessment process 
The intergovernmental status of the IPCC required increasingly complex and bureaucratic 
rules of procedures, which also implied that the provision of assessments became an 
increasingly time-consuming endeavour. With the extensive review procedures adopted in the 
1999 revision of rules of procedure, the time spent on reviewing IPCC reports exceeds the 
time spent on actually writing them and some scientists became more reluctant to participate 
in the process. Tom Wigley, for instance, decided to withdraw from the process because he 
felt his time was better spent by “doing science, rather than reviewing it” (cited in Skodvin 
2000b: 411). Other scientists have also stated that “being an IPCC author [is turning] ‘into a 
full-time job’” (ibid.). A key question, therefore, is how rules and procedures for scientific 
assessments can be made less complex and bureaucratic without jeopardizing their crucial 
role as guardians of the scientific integrity of the assessments.  
 
                                                     
14 The New York Times, 24 April 2009: ”Industry ignored its scientists on climate”, by Andrew C. 
Revkin. Retrieved 29 November 2009 from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/science/earth/24deny.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print.  
CICERO Policy Note 2010:01 
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): Outline of an assessment 
 
 
 
 
14 
References 
Agrawala, S. (1998a). Context and early origins of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
Climatic Change, 39: 605–620. 
Agrawala, S. (1998b). Structural and process history of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Climatic Change, 39: 621–642. 
Alfsen, K. H., J. S. Fuglestvedt, H. M. Seip, and T. Skodvin (2000). Climate change. Scientific 
background and process. CICERO Report: 2000:1, Oslo. 
Andresen, S., T. Skodvin, A. Underdal and J. Wettestad (2000). Science in international environmental 
regimes:  Between integrity and involvement. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. 
Boehmer-Christiansen, S. (1994). Global climate protection policy: The limits of scientific advice, Part 
1 and 2. Global E nvironmental Change, 4 (2): 140–159, and (3): 185–200. 
Bolin, B. (2007). A history of the science and politics of climate change:  The role of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Collingridge, D. and C. Reeve (1986). Science speaks to power:  The role of experts in policy making. 
London: Frances Pinter Publishers. 
Edwards, P. N. and S. H. Schneider (2001). Self-governance and peer review in science-for-policy: The 
case of the IPCC Second Assessment Report. In C. A. Miller and P. N. Edwards (eds.), Changing 
the atmosphere:  E xpert knowledge and environmental governance. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press, pp. 219–246. 
IPCC (1993). “IPCC procedures for preparation, review, acceptance, approval and publication of its 
reports”, approved by the IPCC at the ninth session in Geneva, June 1993. 
IPCC (1995). Climate change 1994: Radiative forcing of climate change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
IPCC (1998). “Principles governing IPCC work”, adopted at the fourteenth session in Vienna in 
October 1998. Available at www.ipcc.ch, accessed 28 November 2009. 
IPCC (1999). “Procedures for the preparation, review, acceptance, adoption, approval and publication 
of IPCC Reports”, adopted at the fifteenth session in San Jose, April 1999. Appendix A to 
“Principles governing IPCC work”. Available at www.ipcc.ch, accessed 28 November 2009. 
Manabe, S. and R. T. Wetherald (1967). Thermal equilibrium of the atmosphere with a given 
distribution of relative humidity. J. Atmospheric Sciences 24 (3), pp 241-259. 
Masood, Ehsan (1996). Climate report 'subject to scientific cleansing', Nature 381, 546-546 (13 June 
1996) doi:10.1038/381546a0  
Litfin, K. (2004). Ozone Discourses:  Science and politics in global environmental cooperation. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Schneider, S. H. and L. E. Mesirow (1976). The genesis strategy. Plenum Press 
Skjærseth, J. B. and T. Skodvin (2003). Climate change and the oil industry:  Common problem, 
varying strategies. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. 
Skodvin, T. (2000a). Structure and agent in the scientific diplomacy of climate change. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
Skodvin, T. (2000b). Revised rules of procedure for the IPCC process: Editorial Essay. Climatic 
Change, 46: 409–415. 
Watkins, M. (1998). Building momentum in negotiations: Time-related costs and action forcing 
events”. Negotiation Journal, 14 (3): 241–256. 
